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still very slow 
This is the Third Report of the European Forecasting Network on 
the Euro area. Although on each occasion we started at the 
pessimistic end of the spectrum of forecasters, we are yet again 
revising downwards our forecasts for 2002 and 2003. Growth of 
0.8% in 2002 will be followed by only 1.2% in 2003 and 2.1 % in 
2004. This anaemic recovery from the downturn in 2001 has been 
exacerbated by a series of negative shocks including rising oil prices 
and the considerable uncertainty about the prospects of the Iraq war 
that have depressed consumption, investment and world trade. 
Moreover, the pre-occupation with a ceiling for the inflation rate of 
2% has meant that the ECB has had to be rather cautious in its 
policy choices. The effects of the mildly expansionary monetary 
policy are balanced by the behaviour of unit labour costs and the 
output gap. Overall, our forecast for HICP inflation is 2.4% for 2003 
and 1.8% for 2004, not too far from the recent years’ average of 
1.9%. A target of 2% in the HICP with a symmetric error margin  of 
plus or minus 1% would have allowed the ECB to be more relaxed 
in its setting of monetary policy and to give greater weight to short 
run movements of output. 
At the same time, the pro-cyclical fiscal policies of several 
countries, most noticeably France and Germany, when the business 
cycle was in upswing during 1999 and 2000, combined with the 
requirements in the Stability and Growth Pact, left these countries in 
a vulnerable position once a downturn started. 
This highlights the difficulties of reforming the SGP. It is easy to 
see good reasons for adopting a more flexible approach that 
addressed more explicitly the need to combine short term sensitivity 
to the business cycle with longer term commitment to reducing 
overall debt levels in order to create room in the future to cope with 
the general ageing of the population. The problem is one of 
implementation. In the present climate many governments would 
use such a reform as a further excuse for postponing the structural 
reforms that are needed.  
A number of commentators have pointed to the Code for Fiscal 
Stability that guides fiscal policy in the United Kingdom. This has 
been suggested as a possible template for fiscal policy in Europe as 
an alternative to the Stability and Growth Pact. The problem again is 
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that the Code would be a 'one size fits all' rule. The code suits 
the UK because the starting point was a relatively low and 
easily sustainable level of debt in relation to national income. 
There is also a need to rebuild a seriously depleted public 
sector capital stock. The use of the 'Golden Rule' - that over 
the course of the business cycle current expenditure is not 
financed by borrowing - is in direct conflict with the 
expectation of the SGP that the general government balance be 
close to balance or in surplus. To finance net capital 
expenditure by borrowing implies a persistent deficit into the 
medium term, and would in any case require a strict 
classification of investment expenditures to prevent “creative 
accounting”. 
The recent proposals from the EC to strengthen budgetary 
coordination by giving more emphasis to the cyclically 
adjusted position and to the sustainability of total debt, goes 
some way towards improving the flexibility of the system, but 
it still falls short of the need to tailor fiscal policy to the 
particular circumstances of different countries that start from 
radically different debt levels. 
Notwithstanding the short run difficulties of economic 
recovery, there are a number of medium term developments 
that are of much more importance for the evolution of the 
Euro area and require careful analysis. In particular, in 2004 
10 new members will join the European Union. Although this 
will initially raise total EU GDP by only about 9%, it will 
raise the population by almost 20%. There is also a 
considerable dispersion of per capita incomes within the group 
of new member countries, with Cyprus at 80% of the EU 
average, but Latvia at only a third of EU levels and Poland at 
40%. In the longer term, we expect the extension of the Single 
Market to increase the process of economic convergence 
though, as we note later, there will remain considerable 
dispersion in incomes especially at the regional level that may 
require particular transfer policies. Furthermore, many of the 
accession countries have large agricultural sectors, which 
could necessitate substantial modifications in the current 
agricultural subsidization policies. Finally, it is worth 
remembering that the substantial heterogeneity of the 
accession countries will make 'one fits all' rules very difficult 
to implement and call for a careful tailoring of policies. 
Because of their importance, three chapters of this report are 
devoted to the analysis of, respectively, the expected impact of 
accession on the current members of the European Union, the 
macroeconomic outlook and the main challenges for the 
accession countries, and the economic consequences of 
 iii
accession at a regional level. 
 
We use a general equilibrium approach to look at the impact 
on product and labour markets of the enlargement to 25 
member states. We find that the effects on existing members 
are minor but there is a significant boost to the output of the 
accession countries.  
Specifically, we consider a scenario that combines economic 
integration with farm support in accessing countries. All 
countries contribute to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
according to their GDP, a sum which is augmented by EU 
tariff revenues on agricultural products. This amount is then 
shared among incumbent and accessing countries in proportion 
of their agricultural output, as follows: current member states 
immediately receive the full amount, whereas accessing 
countries receive only 30% in 2005 and progressively increase 
their share up to 100% in 2012 on a linear basis. 
It turns out that the impact on Euro area GDP is close to zero, 
whereas it reaches 7% for all the accession countries bar the 
Baltic States, who would be worse off. This is probably due to 
their different pattern of sectoral specialisation and trade. 
According to the simulation results, the fear that integration 
will be harmful for EU15 unskilled worker is not well 
founded. On the contrary, the market enlargement and the 
following reallocation have in fact practically no impact on 
their wages. Accession countries show a rather differentiated 
pattern: in Poland and Hungary unskilled labour is worse off, 
especially in the short term, due to the adverse influence 
accession has on these countries’ agricultural sector. In the 
other countries, characterised by a more diversified industrial 
structure, the result is the opposite. 
 
With reference to economic policy in the accession countries,
on the basis of their economic outlook we identify the 
following two problem areas: 
• The need for fiscal restraint.  
• The interaction between monetary and fiscal policies, and 
the role of an independent central bank. 
 
The fiscal balances of four Central European candidates for 
EU membership—Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia—have deteriorated considerably over the last two 
years. The reasons for the widening of state and consolidated 
budget deficits have differed among the countries. Some of the 
excessive increases in expenditures stemmed from outlays 
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related to the implementation of pension, health care, and 
educational reforms. The new members of NATO also found 
that increased security comes at a cost, as the alliance required 
upgrades to military installations and equipment. Furthermore, 
the economic slowdown across the region that hit in late 2001 
and early 2002 brought tax revenues below expectations and 
resulted in short-term liquidity problems for the public sector. 
Finally, the governments in Hungary and the Czech Republic 
introduced extensive fiscal packages to stimulate their 
struggling economies through large-scale investment and 
current spending programs. A major programme of fiscal 
consolidation should be outlined, possibly with the 
introduction of medium term expenditure ceilings. 
 
The expansionary fiscal policy has usually been accompanied 
by tight monetary policy to fight inflation. In some countries, 
most notably in Poland, this mix of restrictive monetary and 
expansionary fiscal policies led to a large inflow of 
speculative portfolio capital and to at least a temporary 
overvaluation of the local currency, reducing the availability 
of domestic credit needed to spur growth in capital investment 
and the construction sector. In addition, high interest rates on 
domestic credit encouraged local companies to seek financing 
abroad, rapidly increasing foreign indebtedness.   
 
The tight monetary policies of the central banks are generating 
significant political opposition. The governments see the 
independent central banks as obstacles to achieving higher 
rates of economic growth, reducing unemployment rates, etc. 
More radical parliamentarians are putting forward proposals 
for legislation either to widen the number of operational goals 
of the central bank to include promoting economic growth, or 
to seriously amend the system of appointing new members of 
the monetary policy bodies so as increase the influence over 
their decisions of parliaments and governments. This approach 
could lead to inter-institutional animosities and dramatically 
reduce the ability of the central banks to fulfil their 
constitutional duties. The most drastic examples of such 
conflicts are the developments in Poland and Hungary. In both 
cases, the central banks have come under fire from the 
government and the employers’ organisations for “allegedly” 
keeping interest rates too high.  
The European Commission and other EU representatives, on 
several occasion, have already addressed the need to maintain 
full central bank independences in the accession countries –







































A new regional 




our view, warranted.  
A further challenge for macroeconomic policy in the accession 
countries, but also for the EU, is the existence of substantial 
regional disparities. Previous experiences of enlargement 
(Greece, Spain and Portugal in the eighties) have shown that 
there is indeed convergence towards the EU average per capita 
income, but some regions converge more rapidly than others, 
so that within specific countries there can be an increase in 
regional income disparities. Regions that start off relatively 
poor as compared to their national average end up relatively 
poorer. Therefore, during the integration process, inequality 
among countries in the EU-12 has decreased, but differences 
between regions in the poorest countries have increased, in 
spite of the existence of structural funds. 
The best performing regions, in terms of GDP per capita 
(GDPpc), have a diversified sectorial structure, in which high 
tech industries and knowledge intensive services (especially 
credit and insurance services) play important roles, are close 
to the European core, with substantial R&D expenditure and 
have relatively qualified labour forces. In contrast, there are 
regions with a low degree of diversification in their sectorial 
structures (and thus a greater sensitivity to asymmetric 
shocks), relatively high levels of specialisation in the 
Agricultural sector and mature low tech industries (such as 
Textiles and Clothing, Paper and printing or Non-metallic 
minerals and mineral products) in the initial period,  are far 
from the European core, with low investment in R&D and 
with a preponderance of low-skilled labour. These regions 
have lost ground after 15 years of integration, and are caught 
in a poverty trap.   
Coming to the accession countries, the regions that are closer 
to the big European markets and the European Core 
(especially the border regions) and are highly specialised in 
knowledge-intensive services (in particular, Services of credit 
and insurance) are clearly better positioned than the others in 
terms of GDP per capita, and are more likely to benefit from 
integration. The opposite is found in those candidate regions 
far from the European Core and highly specialised in 
Agricultural products. 
In the light of past experience, the maintenance of the current 
policy could mean that internal regional disparities in 
candidate countries will continue or even rise after 
enlargement. But the main worry is the persistence of 
polarisation. So a great deal of work remains to be done in 
order to create a new regional policy within an enlarged EU.  
However, prior to defining a structural framework for regional 
support, the EU would need to decide on its main social, 
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arises: should the prime objective of regional policy move 
towards economic efficiency and competitiveness or does a 
valid rationale also lie in providing support for regions which 
will always be disadvantaged by geography or economics? 
Then, regional policy faces a trade-off between equity and 
efficiency.  
Priority focused on achieving equity would imply policy 
measures addressed to backward regions. In this sense, results 
obtained from this analysis would suggest some possible 
measures that could contribute to reduce the regional 
disparities: specific measures designed to speed up the 
adjustment of industrial structures and to encourage the 
development of new undertakings; promoting product 
differentiation and increasing competitiveness in sectors such 
as Agricultural and traditional areas (Textiles, Food, Paper 
among others) and thus to combat their lower value added; 
increasing investment in inter-regional infrastructures in order 
to improve the accessibility of the poorest regions; increasing 
R&D spending in order to promote the innovation and its 
diffusion; and implementing effective human capital policies 
in backward regions. Additionally, measures addressed to 
these less developed regions could also benefit to the most 
prosperous regions (for instance, in the form of imports). On 
the contrary, if efficiency would be the main goal, promoting 
growth at the most prosperous regions would be the key point. 
In this case, it could be expected a spillover effect on less 
favoured regions (favouring equity in the longer run). 
 
The economic impact of the enlargement on the Euro area 
should be analyzed jointly with other possible external 
shocks, such as a large US slowdown similar to the one that 
took place recently. At the end of 2000 it was widely believed 
that the impact of a US downturn on Europe could be quite 
limited - the Euro area, after all, approximates a closed 
economy and sophisticated multi-country econometric models 
(the IMF’s Multimod was then a leading example), which 
take full account of the trade linkages between economies, 
indicated that the spillover from the US to Europe would be 
relatively small.  In the event, the US downturn in 2001 seems 
to have heralded a relatively severe drop in output growth in 
Europe, too. 
Forecasts compiled in the Autumn of 2000 for output growth 
in the Euro area for the following year gave an impression of 
continued buoyancy which was to be rudely betrayed by 
reality. The European Commission’s November 2000 forecast 
for growth in the Euro area in the calendar year 2001, at 



































data puts the 2001 Euro area growth rate at only 1.4%.  The 
period of relatively asynchronous business cycle experience in 
the 80s and 90s seems to have given way to a highly 
synchronous downturn at the beginning of the new decade.  
For Euro area policy-makers the significance seems obvious: 
if spillovers from the US economy are highly significant for 
the Euro area, policy will need to track and anticipate the US 
economy and policy measures can be brought forward 
promptly on this basis.  If, on the other hand, the spillovers are 
small then the Euro area policy makers can treat the Euro area 
as a closed economy and US developments can be given lesser 
weight. 
We find that the transmission of US shocks to Europe is fast 
and powerful, with about 50% of the size of the US shock 
being transmitted to European countries within a year. 
Whereas traditional multi-country models base their 
transmission channels solely on trade factors and produce 
evidence of a small spillover, it seems that a number of other 
channels must be active since our findings embody fast and 
sizable transmission. It must be significant that financial 
integration in the world economy has increased and that a 
large proportion of production comes from firms which are 
multinational in character.  The increasingly high correlation 
of  stock market indices round the world  suggests that one 
channel of transmission of a shock mainly affecting the US is 
through this route;  at the same time, monetary policy in other 
countries has to take the setting of US monetary policy into 
account.  The behavior of the foreign exchanges may capture 
the markets’ assessments of individual country exposure. We 
provide evidence on what the most important channels of 
transmission are and point to a broad “financial channel” as 
being an important conduit for the transmission, with special 
reference to exchange rates and interest rates. 
 
 
Additional details on the topics considered in this report can 
be found in a set of annexes available on the web site of the 
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Euro Area Outlook and Forecasts 
Economic outlook for 2003 and 2004 
Uncertainty about the Iraq crisis has called the global 
economic recovery into question. During the winter of 
2002/03 this uncertainty was reflected in weak stock 
markets, strong movements in the oil market and of 
exchange rates. Should the oil price remain at high levels 
over a prolonged period of time or go up even further, 
increasing production costs would squeeze profits of 
firms and impair the purchasing power of consumers. 
Immediately after the beginning of the war in Iraq the oil 
prices dropped significantly, but they have increased since 
then. While the appreciation of the euro versus the dollar 
has dampened the effects of the oil price hike, a 
continuation of this process will harm exports, which 
have been an important source of growth in the Euro area 
during the last few years.  
Very high oil prices and a continuing depreciation of the 
dollar are however not expected to continue much further 
into 2003 and 2004. Instead, we believe that the current 
oil price level reasonably reflects the present risks for 
world oil supply and that the exchange rate for the dollar 
is partly determined by expectations about the possible 
future costs of the US engagement in the Middle East. At 
1.10 the Euro is indeed approaching the bottom value of 
what is generally considered to be its long run equilibrium 
exchange rate. Thus, further price and exchange rate 
movements are not the main driving forces for our 
forecasts; as the oil price is assumed to fluctuate around 
24.5 for the remainder of 2003 and 23.5 US dollar per 
barrel for 2004. 
 
Our forecasts for GDP growth are 1.2 and 2.1% for 2003 
and 2004 respectively. These forecasts hinge on the 
assumption that political uncertainty in the Middle East 
will decrease rapidly. In particular, we expect that the war 
in Iraq will not lead to significant disruptions in the world 
economy. In the second half of 2003, economic recovery 
in the major world regions will gain momentum slightly. 
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Euro area activity    
economic activities in the US. In Japan, sustained growth is 
still hampered by the lack of structural reforms. It should be 
noted however that, in some world regions economic activity 
has remained robust, in particular in Central and Eastern 
Europe as well as Southeast Asia. Summing up, the stimulus 
for the Euro area from world trade is expected to gain 
momentum, though only very gradually, over the forecast 
horizon.  
The expected sluggish economic recovery in the US is likely 
to affect the Euro area countries to different degrees. Each 
country benefits not only directly from the economic recovery 
in the US by its bilateral trade linkages, but also due to the 
linkages with the other countries which are also positively 
influenced by the US expansion. Furthermore, international 
trade is not the only channel of business cycle transmission. A 
further source of shock propagation is the increasing 
interdependence of capital markets, which are currently very 
adversely affected by the uncertainty in the world economy. In 
addition, the investment decisions of multinational companies 
are also important. Therefore, an overall measure of the 
influence of economic developments abroad on the domestic 
economy is required. France and Germany, for example, 
depend to a larger degree on external economic developments 
than Italy and Spain. If the growth rate of industrial production 
in the US increases by one percentage point, the cumulative 
gain in the growth rate of industrial production after the 
adjustment processes have run their course amounts to more 
than 0.8 percentage points in France and Germany. The 
corresponding figures for Spain and Italy are somewhat lower. 
For 2003 we forecast a 2.2% rate of growth for the annual 
average of the industrial production in US and only 0.8% for 
the Euro area. 
Improvements in the global economy in the course of 2003, 
expected to arise after the end of the Iraq crisis, will help to 
restore investor and consumer confidence. In the last two 
years over-capacity has already been reduced considerably, 
and the increase in demand will encourage companies to 
invest more. In addition, the financing conditions will be 
supported by low interest rates in the Euro area. Furthermore, 
the rise in unit labour costs will be significantly lower than in 
previous years. Capital obsolescence, especially of new 
technologies and in the rising share of ICT goods in capital 
stock which depreciate very rapidly, could reinforce such a 
process. Investment activity is also supported by the pick up in 
demand. However, persistently high unemployment will mean 
that private consumption will only accelerate at a low pace. 
The forecasts of the main macroeconomic aggregates are 
summarised in table 1.1 
The end of the Iraq 






Table 1.1: Economic outlook for the Euro area 
  2000 2001 2002 2003: 1st half 2003: annual 2004: annual














GDP 3.5 1.4 0.8 1.1 1.7 1.2 1.8 2.1 2.8
1.8 1.4 1.4
Potential Output 2.9 2.8 2.1 2.1 2.4 1.9 2.3 1.9 2.4
0.2 0.2 1.0
Private Consumption 2.5 1.8 0.6 1.0 1.8 1.0 1.8 2.0 3.1
1.7 1.6 0.9Government 
Consumption 2.0 2.1 2.5 1.9 2.2 1.8 2.1 1.3 1.7
-2.5 -1.1 1.9
Fixed Capital Formation 4.9 -0.6 -2.5 -0.6 1.3 0.9 2.9 4.3 6.5
1.7 1.0 3.4
Exports 12.6 2.8 1.2 3.7 5.8 3.3 5.6 6.3 9.0
1.2 1.3 4.4
Imports 11.3 1.5 -0.3 3.7 6.2 4.0 6.7 7.7 10.9
8.6 8.7 8.7
Unemployment Rate 8.5 8.0 8.3 8.7 8.8 8.8 8.9 9.0 9.4
8.1 7.9 8.3
NAIRU 9.1 8.6 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.2 8.4 8.6 9.0
2.6 2.6 2.4
Labour Costs 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.1 3.5 3.0 3.4 3.0 3.6
0.4 0.9 1.5
Labour Productivity 1.3 0.4 0.1 1.0 1.6 1.3 1.8 2.1 2.6
1.8 1.7 0.8
HICP 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.8 2.4 3.1 1.8 2.8
Industrial Production 3.5 0.4 -0.8 0.3 0.8 2.0
Percentage change in the average level compared with the same period a year earlier, except for 
unemployment rate and NAIRU that are expressed in levels. Point forecasts and 80% confidence bounds are 
taken from EFN forecasting models and based on 2000 stochastic simulations.  








The recent pronounced appreciation of the Euro, 
together with sluggish demand on export markets, 
started to take its toll. In the fourth quarter of 2002, 
exports stagnated. We expect that also in the first half of 
the current year Euro area exports will be hampered by 
these factors. With increasing world demand and the 
fading out of the effects of the Euro appreciation we 
expect Euro area exports to gain momentum in the 
second half of the year. Our forecast, however, hinges 
on the assumption that the war in Iraq will only be rather 
short and that repercussions on the world economy 
remain limited. 
In this context, the monetary factors pushing up inflation 
are compensated by the deviation of prices from the 
trend in unit labour cost and the transitory effects due to 
the output gap, changes in unit labour costs, etc. 
Therefore, our inflation forecasts, 2.4% in 2003 and 
1.8% in 2004, tend to their mean level which turns out 
to be constant in the recent years at about 1.9%.  
Comparison with alternative forecasts 
The forecasts presented above are obtained by the EFN 
macroeconometric model, described in detail in the 
Spring 2002 report. Table 1.2 reports a comparison of 
the EFN forecasts of the main macroeconomic 
aggregates with alternative forecasts, notably those of 
the European Commission, the OECD, and Consensus 
Economics Inc. 
For 2003, the EFN forecast for GDP growth is close to 
the consensus forecast, while the other forecasts are 
higher. The divergences can be ascribed partly to the 
different information sets. In particular, the Commission 
and the OECD published their forecasts at a time when a 
more optimistic outlook for the world economy 
prevailed. Anticipations of revised IMF and 
Commission forecasts indicate much lower values, in 
line with the Consensus ones. In particular, the EFN 
forecast for private consumption is pessimistic, 
reflecting mostly higher unemployment. This in turn 
implies a lower contribution of private consumption and 
– due to the demand effect – capital formation to GDP 
growth in 2003. This lack of domestic demand causes a 
slower rise in imports and therefore a larger contribution 
of net exports is therefore implied. For 2004, we expect 
a negative contribution from net exports to GDP growth, 
and, compared to the Commission and the OECD, a 
more subdued recovery of domestic demand. The 
increase of working days in 2004 is expected to have 
only a negligible effect on the economic performance. 
 
 











2.4% for 2003 
















































Table 2: Comparison of EFN Forecasts with alternative Forecasts 
  EFN EU OECD Consensus 
  2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 
GDP 1.2 2.1 1.8 2.6 1.8 2.7 1.1 2.1 
Private Consumption 1.0 2.0 1.7 2.3 1.5 2.5 1.2 1.9 
Government Consumption 1.8 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 
Fixed Capital Formation 0.9 4.3 2.0 4.0 1.6 3.1 0.2 2.8 
Unemployment Rate 8.8 9.0 8.3 8.0 8.5 8.3 8.7 8.5 
Consumer Prices (HICP) 2.4 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.6 
Industrial Production 0.8 2.0     1.0 2.7 
EU: European Commission, European Economy, No. 5, 2002; OECD: OECD Economic Outlook, No. 72, 
December 2002; Consensus: Consensus Economics Inc., Consensus Forecasts, March 2003 
Table 3: Comparison of spring forecast with previous outlooks 
 Actual Spring 2003 Autumn 2002 Spring 2002 
 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 
GDP 0.8 1.2 0.9 2.2 1.2 2.2 
Private Consumption 0.6 1.0 0.5 1.4 1.8 2.1 
Government Consumption 2.5 1.8 1.7 1.2 1.5 0.9 
Fixed Capital Formation -2.5 0.9 -1.7 2.3 -1.4 0.2 
Exports 1.2 3.3 1.7 8.7 2.3 9.1 
Imports -0.3 4.0 0.1 8.6 2.1 8.3 
Unemployment Rate 8.3 8.8 8.3 8.6 8.4 8.1 
HICP Inflation 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.2 






Our inflation forecasts are higher than all the alternatives in 
Table 2 possibly due to the fact that the former incorporates 
the impact of the increases of the international crude prices 
occurring up to March 2003.  
Forecast comparison with previous outlook 
Table 3 shows a comparison between our spring forecast for 
2002 and 2003 with the forecasts in the previous reports and 
with the actual outcome in 2002. In autumn 2002, no forecast 
for 2004 was published. Over time the growth rates of GDP 
and all expenditure aggregates have been slightly revised 
downwards, except for government consumption. The changes 
can be explained partly by data revisions and the longer time 
span of available data, implying a different starting point of 
the forecast. In addition, the outlook concerning the recovery 
of the world economy has become more pessimistic. This is 
reflected in the lower predicted growth rate of world trade. 
Accordingly, the forecast for exports has been revised 
downwards. Due to the weaker domestic demand in the Euro 
area, imports are expected to increase at a slower pace. It 
should be kept in mind that especially the data at the end of 
the sample are subject to revisions in the future. 
The inflation forecasts are higher than in previous reports 
mainly due to the changes in the expectations of crude oil 
prices. 
Structural factors hamper growth 
The Euro area will be able to benefit from its large size only if 
domestic conditions permit it to do so. In 2003 and 2004, 
domestic factors will be the driving force of GDP growth (see 
figure 1.1). It is however striking that potential output growth 
of the Euro area is continuously decreasing over the years in 
our forecast horizon. Similarly, the NAIRU remains extremely 
high and productivity gains are limited. In total, despite the 
fact that domestic demand will recover gradually, compared to 
the last economic upswing, domestic demand will remain 
subdued. The lack of private investment is critical in this 
regard, as it hampers capital accumulation and potential GDP. 
Therefore, policies devised to strengthen long-term growth are 
required. 
In the current situation, supporting domestic demand implies 
restoring confidence of consumers and investors. Fiscal and 
monetary policy measures could be embedded in a 
comprehensive political strategy. But the requirements of the 
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the interest rate cast doubts on the efficacy of traditional 
economic policy 
Thus, structural reforms are at stake. For instance, restoring 
confidence in the pension systems, by adapting their design to 
the ongoing ageing of the labour force could restore consumer 
confidence. Moreover, since private consumption growth is 
hampered by high unemployment in the Euro area, any 
progress on the front of employment, for example, reforms to 
bring more flexibility to the labour market, may translate into 
additional demand and thus additional growth. In the same 
way, increasing integration of goods and services markets and 
deregulations of formerly sheltered industries would stimulate 
employment and overall growth in the long run.   
The labour market 
Since 2000, labour productivity has been growing slower than 
wages, lowering profit margins and investment. Consequently, 
the creation of employment having come to a halt, we expect 
the unemployment rate to rise to 9.0% over the next two years. 
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long-term and caused by microeconomic factors, such as 
unfavourable institutional structures, especially in labour 
markets. Because much of the wage bargaining process is 
centralised, wages and labour costs are not flexible enough to 
reflect labour market conditions adequately. Sector-wide 
agreements ignore heterogeneity at the level of the individual 
firm, while opening clauses are not easy to apply.  
However, one should also stress that reforms of factor markets 
are currently in progress in Europe, and thanks to the internal 
market programme, the deregulation of goods and services 
markets is precisely what Europe has embarked upon. While
the pace of reforms needs to be maintained, simplistic 
recommendations should be avoided, since social cohesion is a 
necessary condition for long run growth. This is particularly 
true in episodes of slow down of the economy, where safety 
nets are required to ease adjustments.  
As far as potential output is concerned, early retirement is 
exerting a negative impact on labour supply and potential 
output. Trying to generate a higher participation rate of the 
elderly by introducing a later retirement age is one strategic 
policy that could be adopted to offset these effects. This would 
also serve to ease the pension squeeze evident in many Euro 
area countries, since contributions for social security can 
hardly be increased repeatedly.  
Inflation differentials, real interest rates and 
monetary policy  
This report forecasts annual harmonized consumer price 
inflation for 2003 over the upper limit of the inflation range 
considered to be compatible with price stability by the ECB. 
Among member countries, however, inflation rates for 2002 
differed considerably, varying from 1.3% in Germany to 4.7% 
in Ireland and for 2003 this variation is forecast from 1.0 to 
4.5%. This phenomenon is due partly to structural 
convergence processes, and partly to differences in the 
strength of demand among member countries. 
Data from financial markets show however that inflation rates 
are not expected to converge significantly any time soon.  On 
the other hand, nominal interest rates are uniform in the Euro 
area so that low inflation countries experience higher real 
interest rates, and this in turn  limits spending decisions and 
leads to upward pressures on prices (vice versa for  higher 
inflation countries). 
On the other hand higher inflation countries typically start 
from lower price levels and increase the quality of their 
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remain competitive. Since the HICP does not correct 
practically for quality increments, it could be the case that 
estimates of inflation in lower-price countries is upwardly 
biased. These biases should be corrected but data on quality of 
goods and consumers satisfaction on services are required. 
After this correction the true inflation would be smaller in the 
lower price countries implying a partial convergence of real 
interest rates. A more accurate measurement of the HICP 
would help the conduct of the monetary policy and the 










The Impact of Enlargement on the Current and 
New Member States 
The main issues raised by enlargement  
Ten new members will be welcomed into the European 
Union from 1 May 2004. In this section of our report we ask 
whether this is good news for current member states from an 
economic point of view, while taking as given the historical 
opportunity to achieve the unification of Europe on the basis 
of common values such as democracy, competition and social 
welfare. 
There is a concern within the EU about the forthcoming 
enlargement. Three issues are at stake. Firstly, accession will 
involve a large number of countries which will potentially 
give rise to institutional conflicts. Secondly, these countries 
exhibit incomes per capita much lower than the per capita 
incomes of current member states, raising the thorny subject 
of social competition and the fears of massive relocation of 
industries or massive migrations. Finally, the agricultural 
sector represents a disproportionate share of GDP in certain 
accessing countries, which raises the issue of the CAP 
(Common Agricultural Policy) and whether or how it will be 
adjusted or not in order to take account of the new member 
states. However, these impacts should be smoothed by the fact 
that liberalisation of markets is an ongoing process. EU 
industries are already confronted by the competition of East 
European producers, and adjustments there have already taken 
place. In the same way, convergence of accessing countries 
will reduce the competitive pressure and enlarge the markets 
opened to incumbent countries’ producers. 
These are typically issues that have to be tackled by 
considering general equilibrium mechanisms. Such an 
approach allows us to take into account fully the relationships 
between goods markets and factor markets, while 
simultaneously accounting for the sizes of the countries 
considered, since this is a very important determinant of the 
magnitude of the impacts to be expected.   
There have been many studies adopting such a methodology. 
Bchir & Maurel (2002), Lejour & Nahuis (2002) or 
Maliszewzka (2002) all raise the issue of integration aspects 
going beyond the reduction of formal tariffs. Full entry means 
accession to the internal market (and thus reduction in border 
formalities or decisions taken by firms on a different 
geographical scope, for instance) and eventually expected 
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namely trade integration, economic integration, and economic 
convergence in line with TFP catch up. Lejour & Nahuis start 
by assessing the impact of the accession on the internal market 
by  estimating  gravity  equations  at  the  industry level. This 
first step is used as an input in a second step in which this 
trade potential is used in a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model of the world economy. Maliszewska focuses on 
single market-related mechanisms.  
As far as agriculture is concerned, the final impact relies on 
the type of assumption made on transfer payments and farm 
support granted to accessing countries. Assumptions can range 
from zero to full benefit. In the latter case one could either 
redistribute the shares of the pie, or increase the size of the pie 
with constant shares (Frandsen & Jansen, 2001; Bchir & 
Maurel, 2002). A key assumption is the magnitude of the 
output changes in accessing countries when farm support is 
introduced, namely the elasticity of production.  Reciprocally, 
any general increase in the output in agriculture should be 
constrained by the availability of arable land and other 
resources used. Depending on the set of assumptions made, 
the change in output can be either limited or very large. 
Summing up, although it is rather elementary to compute how 
the EU budget will be affected by this enlargement, it is much 
more difficult to assess how the economies of incumbent 
member states will be affected at the macro-economic as well 
as the sectoral level. 
Given the very large gap in per capita income and factor 
endowment, one natural concern is that the EU enlargement 
will dramatically alter the specialisation pattern in the 
continent, with existing EU members bearing the high re-
allocation costs.  In particular, a clear risk commonly 
envisaged is that labour intensive industries will relocate 
massively to new member states (whose wages are on average 
15% at current exchange rates or one fourth at Purchasing 
Parity levels of EU levels). Such a dramatic shift would 
possibly harm collar workers who would face a drastic 
reduction in wages or (more probably, given the 
characteristics of EU labour market) mounting unemployment.
The potential impact on CEECs should be different since these 
economies will join a hugely integrated area, which is much 
more than simply joining a free trade arrangement. It is very 
difficult to draw a precise picture since previous episodes of 
enlargements do not provide comparisons. For instance, 
combining transition and enlargement can have interesting 
outcomes associated with imperfect competition mechanisms: 
Boeri & Oliveira-Marins (2002) point out that taking into 
account the “love for variety” of consumers profoundly affects 
conclusions. Confronting the consumers with a huge variety of 
products, as compared to the previous situation of planned 
economies, has translated into an initial and large trade deficit 
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in differentiated goods, to be balanced by large exports of the 
homogeneous goods. In the same way, it is difficult to asses a 
priori what the behaviour of firms will be, following on a 
dramatic change in the scale of their playing field, in terms of 
investment, mark ups etc. 
East-West trade patterns have already changed dramatically 
within a decade. The European Union is already the CEECs 
main trading partner, absorbing roughly 68% of their total 
exports. Of course, given the difference in economic size, the 
reverse is not true: only 4% of EU total imports come from 
these countries. With the exception of agriculture and 
antidumping, accession countries have been granted free 
access to the European market. The reverse is not true 
however, as some accession countries still keep some forms of 
import restriction.  However, as a consequence of transition to 
a market economy and ongoing integration to the rest of 
Europe, accession countries’ economies are undergoing a deep 
change in production structures. The fast diversification of 
production is resulting in a marked increase in intra-industry 
trade. 
General equilibrium dimensions of enlargement 
As far as the EU15 economies are concerned, the big 
difference in size with respect to the accession countries and 
the pronounced asymmetry in the trade structure hint at a very 
limited impact of trade integration.  
In contrast, the effects on new members will be enormous.  At 
this stage, accession countries have already reaped the short-
term benefits from previous trade agreements with the EU, as 
they have traded with it without barriers for the last seven 
years. However, the medium run adjustment is likely to have 
at least two adverse consequences for them. First , the removal 
of the remaining trade barriers will entail a deterioration in 
their terms of trade.  The second, and probably more important 
consequence, is that a higher exposure to international 
competition will harm those sectors still showing large 
inefficiencies. Huge and painful adjustments are expected, 
noticeably in sectors characterised by large increasing returns 
to scale. This would probably call for some policy actions in 
order to smooth the negative impact on income. After that, 
however, the efficiency gains are expected to increase overall 
welfare.  
In order to analyse the integration dynamics and quantify its 
effects it is essential to take into account a wide range of 
transmission channels. Moreover one has to control for the 
general equilibrium effects of the changes in production trade 
patterns, the role played by market structures (i.e. the type of 
competition) and the degree of factor specificity (which is 
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In order to meet these needs we carry on the analysis using 
MIRAGE (see Bchir et al. (2002) for a detailed description of 
the model), a Multi-region, multi-sector CGEM, devoted to 
trade policy analysis. 
The simulation with MIRAGE provides results at the sectorial 
level for the Euro Area as a whole, and for a selected group of 
accession countries.  The variables analysed are trade patterns, 
structure of employment and wages by qualification level, 
structure of employment, activity and firms’ number and size. 
Simulation exercise and policy conclusions 
Enlargement has at least two different meanings:  firstly that 
of trade liberalisation accompanied by the breaking-up of 
residual tariffs and non-tariff (essentially anti-dumping) 
protection. The new members will apply the same common 
external tariff as the existing EU countries. Secondly it will 
mean economic integration, in line with the completion of the 
Single market. Firms, both in the EU15 and the CEECs, will 
take their production decision taking into account an enlarged 
market of 25 members. Products from the CEEC will be 
regarded by consumers as belonging to the same quality ladder 
as EU15 ones. The end of market fragmentation will make for 
stronger competition, pushing mark-ups down. On average, 
firms’ sizes will increase. The magnitude of these effects is 
bound to vary greatly across industries, with the type of 
competition within sectors playing a crucial role. 
We focus here on a scenario that combines economic 
integration with farm support in accessing countries. In both 
scenarios, the common agriculture policy remains unchanged 
and accession countries do not benefit of it.  
In this scenario all countries contribute to the CAP according 
to their GDP, a sum which is augmented by EU tariff revenues 
on agricultural products. This amount is then shared among 
incumbent and accessing countries in proportion to their 
agricultural output, as follows: current member states receive 
immediately the full amount, whereas accessing countries 
receive only 30% in 2005 and increase progressively their 
share up to 100% in 2012 on a linear basis.  
The simulations confirm a tiny impact of accession on EU 
members and an overall huge and beneficial impact on 
accession countries. Chart 1 shows that the effects on Euro 
area GDP are close to zero, whereas they reach 7% for all the 
accession countries bar the Baltic States, who would be worse 
off. This is probably due to their different pattern of sectoral 
specialisation and trade. According to the simulation results, 
the fear that integration will be harmful for EU15 unskilled 
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The market enlargement and the resulting reallocation have in 
fact practically no impact on their wages, as shown in Chart 2. 
Accession countries show a very differentiated pattern: in 
Poland and Hungary unskilled labour is worse off, especially 
in the short term, due to the adverse influence accession has 
on these countries’ agricultural sector; in the other countries, 
characterised by a more diversified industrial structure, the 
outcome is the opposite. 
Our simulation shows that full accession to the EU market by 
CEECs will entail large swings in relative prices and real 
exchange rates. Such a phenomenon should be taken into 
account by the accession countries for their decisions on 
exchange rate arrangements, and especially on the timing of 
the adoption of the Euro. While the adoption of a common 
currency will help to boost trade and economic integration 
(see for example Frenkel and Rose (2002)), the quick loss of 
monetary freedom could be harmful for countries undergoing 
big macroeconomic and structural adjustments. This should be 
interpreted as a warning against the proposal of quick adoption 
of the Euro or “euroisation” put forward by some authors. By 
the same token, countries which adopt a monetary policy 
based on inflation targeting should take into account the big 











































Macroeconomic Policy Challenges Facing EU 
Accession Countries 
The need for fiscal 
restraint 
This summary paper should be viewed as accompanying the 
country reports for the 10 EU accession countries in the 
Annex. These reports provide a general overview of the 
accession countries, their economic and demographic size, key 
characteristics of their economies as well as our assessment of 
their short-term outlook. The discussion below concentrates 
on a review of the key macroeconomic challenges these 
countries will be facing in the following years.  
Introduction 
With the accession to the EU of the ten new members 
scheduled to take place on May 1, 2004, the attention of 
policy-makers, both in current member-states and in the 
accession countries, is shifting rapidly from the political and 
organizational aspects of accession towards the economic 
challenges facing future members. This is especially true in 
light of the fact that all of the new members are likely to join 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), most likely 
within the next four to six years. In these discussions, the 
macroeconomic challenges facing the accession countries and 
their impact on the possible future changes in EU policies are 
taking an increasingly important place. Indeed, EU 
membership is only the first of the many major milestones that 
the accession countries will be facing in the next several years. 
 
This brief report identifies the following two problem areas: 
 
• The need for fiscal restraint  
• The interaction between monetary and fiscal policies; and 
the role of an independent central bank. 
Promoting Fiscal Restraint 
Developments in the area of public finance in the accession 
countries clearly constitute the biggest challenge, in particular 
for the largest economies in the group.  The fiscal balances of 
four Central European candidates for EU membership—
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia—have 
deteriorated considerably over the last two years. The reasons 
for the widening of state and consolidated budget deficits have 
What are the main 
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differed among the countries. Some of the excessive increases 
in expenditures stemmed from outlays related to the 
implementation of pension, health care, and educational 
reforms. The new members of NATO have also found that 
increased security comes at a cost, as the alliance required 
upgrades to military installations and equipment. Furthermore, 
the economic slowdown across the region that hit in late 2001 
and early 2002 resulted in tax revenues that were below 
expectations and resulted in short-term liquidity problems for 
the public sector. Finally, the governments in Hungary and the 
Czech Republic introduced extensive fiscal packages to 
stimulate their struggling economies through large-scale 
investment and current spending programs.  
 
In addition to the short-term factors worsening deficits in the 
region, regional budgets are suffering from the effects of past 
decisions taken without proper assessment of their 
consequences. This applies in particular to Poland, where the 
past two coalition governments competed in offering 
entitlements to large portions of the population without taking 
into account the impact of future claims on public funds. In 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the lack of proper 
supervision of the banking system and the indirect method of 
dealing with “bad loan” problems still haunts the national 
governments.  
In many cases, decisions to increase government spending 
from already high levels were made with the full 
understanding that the resulting build-up of deficits and, in 
consequence, of net public debt for the next several years. The 
argument used by some of the local policy-makers in the 
region (some of whom continue to support this view) is that 
while reductions in the budget deficits should be undertaken, 
this process should not ignore the developments in the real 
economy. In brief, if the movement toward greater fiscal 
constraint threatens to bring about a significant slowdown in 
economic growth, such restrictive policy should be reviewed 
and adjusted as appropriate. Notably, the governments of the 
three largest accession countries, Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary, stated recently that while accession to the EMU 
in the shortest possible time would be desirable, their policies 
with respect to fiscal deficits will take into account a variety of 
factors. 
The actions on the part of the national governments with 
respect to public spending clearly confirm that such an 
approach is being applied. Although the fiscal position of 
accession countries has been affected by an economic 
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slowdown that can be at least partially linked to the weakness 
of the global economy, the widening of the budget deficits was 
due mostly to excessive spending rather than to an 
unanticipated shortfall in budgetary revenues. In some cases, 
decisions made in the years 2001-2002 will have long-lasting 
consequences for budget balances. In the most glaring 
example, the Socialist government in Hungary approved a 
50% across-the-board increase in wages of public sector 
employees as of October 2002. This will not only permanently 
increase the public wage component of the state budget by 
20% for 2003 and beyond, but will also launch a wave of 
similar demands for increases in wages by workers employed 
by state-owned companies, and could also cause a ripple effect 
on the private sector wages. Similar decisions could 
destabilize the fiscal position of some accession countries 
even further.    
With budget revenues dependent on tax collections that, in 
turn, reflect the pace of economic growth, economic policy 
should focus on reducing expenditures. A way of reducing 
expenditures gradually without dampening economic growth 
is the implementation of a system of medium-term 
expenditure ceilings. Such ceilings, usually applied for periods 
of between three and five years, would set the maximum 
amounts of spending for all levels of expenditures that are 
relatively fixed and can be predicted. These ceilings apply to 
spending by all branches of the government including off-
budgetary funds. The ceilings can then be reviewed every 
three to five years, and the spending levels monitored 
regularly to determine the availability of funds within the 
preset budget. Such maximum spending targets can be flexible 
from year-to-year, allowing departments and agencies to roll 
over unutilized funds from to the next. Such a system of 
Departmental Expenditure Limits (DELs) is successfully 
applied in the United Kingdom. In addition, under the so-
called Golden Rule in the British system, the government is 
allowed to borrow only to invest and not to finance current 
spending.  
In many of the largest accession countries, the large share of 
fixed costs in the budget, mostly related to social spending, 
limits room for manoeuvring by the governments. Sometimes 
the only hope left is for much stronger growth that would 
boost tax revenues and close the budget gap.  Moreover, the 
willingness of national governments to reduce deficits is 
countered by the need to maintain at least the appearance of an 
intact social safety net. 
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Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policies 
The interaction between fiscal and monetary policies and the 
issue of independence of the central bank are becoming 
increasingly important as accession countries prepare for 
entry into the EU. In the recent past, decisions on the part of 
many regional governments to loosen fiscal policy have been 
accompanied by tight monetary policy to fight inflation. In 
some countries, most notably in Poland, this mix of 
monetary and fiscal policies led to a large inflow of 
speculative portfolio capital and to at least a temporary 
overvaluation of the local currency. This reduced the 
availability of domestic credit needed to spur growth in 
capital investment and the construction sector. In addition, 
high interest rates on domestic credit encouraged local 
companies to seek financing abroad, rapidly increasing 
foreign indebtedness.   
The tight monetary policies of central banks are becoming 
the subject of economic and political debate. The 
governments of the accession countries see the independent 
central banks as obstacles to achieving higher rates of 
economic growth and reducing unemployment rates. More 
radical parliamentarians are putting forward proposals for 
legislation either to widen the number of operational goals of 
the central bank to include promoting economic growth, or 
to amend seriously the system of appointing new members 
of the monetary policy bodies to increase the influence over 
their decisions by parliaments and governments. This 
approach could lead to serious confrontations, and 
dramatically reduce the ability of the central banks to fulfil 
their constitutional duties. The most drastic examples of such 
conflicts are the developments in Poland and Hungary. In 
both cases, the central banks have come under fire from the 
government and the employers’ organisations for “allegedly” 
keeping interest rates too high.  
The European Commission and other EU representatives 
have already addressed in several occasion the need to 
maintain full central bank independence in the accession 
countries – the continuation and stiffening of such approach 
would be, in our view, warranted.  
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The Enlargement and the Spatial Distribution 
of Economic Activity. 








in the future? 
 
 Introduction 
One of the biggest challenges facing the European Union’s 
regional policy is the accession of several new countries.
Conditions in many of these Eastern European countries are
worse than in the least developed regions of the 15 existing 
Member States. Moreover, the accession of these countries is 
likely to have a substantial effect on the geographical 
distribution of economic activity in the rest of the regions of 
the European Union. The economies of the Candidate 
countries are characterised by a predominance of primary and 
secondary activities, with high levels of industrial 
concentration in specific locations, insufficient human capital 
and infrastructure endowments, and a low level of 
participation of small firms.  
Here we discuss the lessons that we have learnt from the latest 
additions to the EU, in order to be able to predict the scenarios 
that may arise from the enlargement scheduled from mid-
2004. The experience gained from the past may aid our 
analysis of potential effects of the fifth enlargement. In 
particular, three questions are considered: 
 
• What effects have previous enlargements had on 
both the spatial distribution of economic activity 
and on the evolution of inequalities? 
• Could the experience of the traditional periphery 
regions in Greece, Portugal or Spain during 
integration shed light on the potential consequences 
of integration for the central and eastern regions of 
Europe? 
• What policy actions should be implemented in the 
future? 
 
To attempt to answer these questions we have analysed two 
main topics: the evolution of regional inequality and the 
spatial distribution of economic activity. We have calculated 
inequality measures to describe the evolution of regional 
disparities following upon the previous enlargement. We have 
also calculated specialisation and concentration indexes in 
order to highlight the effects of enlargement on the spatial 
distribution of activity in the EU. Both sets of results may 
allow us to determine whether there is a relationship between  
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regional wealth  measured in  terms of  GDP per capita and 
sectorial specialisation. With this aim in mind, we compile a 
regional and national database for EU-15 and for Candidate 
countries with a high degree of sectorial detail, from 1985 to 
2001. Our main source was the EUROSTAT REGIO 
Database, complemented with data from National Statistical 
Offices. 
 
Empirical evidence from previous enlargements 
To analyse the evolution of disparities in terms of GDP per 
capita we applied a range of measures of inequality: σ-
convergence, Gini index, polarisation index and estimated 
kernel density functions. The results can be summarised as 
follows.  
First, income differences between member states have fallen 
over time. However, inequality between regions has persisted 
into the last decade, in spite of the considerable efforts of the 
EU to increase funds and to eliminate these disparities. (The 
European budget for 2000-2006 has risen by nearly 30%).  
Second, as regards the evolution of disparities only for regions 
in countries that joined the EU in the eighties (Greece, Spain, 
Portugal), the analysis shows that regions in these countries 
tended to increase their differences and to polarise their 
behaviour towards their own group’s average value. Thus, in 
spite of the stagnation of disparities between EU-15 regions 
during the nineties, considering these regions alone we find an 
increase in the degree of polarisation. This has been caused by 
the behaviour of the better-positioned regions in the selected 
countries, which have moved towards the average levels for 
EU-15, while the relative positions of the poorest regions in 
those countries have not improved (in spite of the existence of 
structural funds). This has created a so-called development 
trap.  
The best positioned regions at the beginning of the period 
were the Spanish regions of Balearics, Navarre, the Basque 
Country, La Rioja, Madrid, Catalonia and Aragon, and  Lisbon 
in Portugal. The worst placed were the Greek regions of 
Voreio Aigaio, Dytiki Ellada and Ipeiros, the Spanish region 
of Extremadura and most Portuguese regions (with the 
exception of Lisbon). At the end of the period the situation has 
not changed; the initial gaps persist. Nonetheless, during the 
period analysed (1985-1999), a degree of convergence 
beetwen regions is observed. In general terms, some of the 
poorest regions in 1985 such as Kritti, Voreio Aigaio, Atikki, 
and particularly Notio Aigaio, Norte and Algarve, grew more 
than the average. The reverse was the case with some of the 
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 However, some of richest (poorest) regions at the beginning of 
the period grew more (less) than the average, leading to an 
increase in the degree of polarisation. For instance, Madrid, 
Lisbon, Catalonia showed notable growth rates (higher than 
the average), while Ionia Nisia, Dityki Ellada, Peloponnisos 
and Centro grew less than the average (despite their gap in 
1985). In addition, Anatolikki Makedonia and Sterea Ellada, 
regions with very low growth rates, fell several places in the 
rankings by the end of the period, showing  a below average 
level of GDP per capita (GDPpc) in 1999, whereas in 1985 
their GDPpc had been above average. 
A question that arises from the above section is this: what 
characterises the regions that have improved so markedly in 
comparison with other regions in the same countries during 
the integration process? In order to identify the main 
characteristics of regions that improved (deteriorated) more 
than expected in terms of GDPpc, we studied the relation 
between relative GDPpcs at the end of period (and growth) 
and  and certain structural variables for this group of regions, 
such as R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP, a 
peripheral index, wages per employee, degree of overall 
specialisation, sectorial structure and distance from the 
European Core. The main conclusions can be summarised as 
follows. 
There seems to be a marked negative correlation between the 
relative GDPpc in 1999, the level of sectorial specialisation in 
1985 and the level of relative specialisation in the Agricultural 
products sector and in mature industries such as Textiles and 
clothing (also in 1985). This is the case of some Greek regions 
(Ionia Nisia, Peloponnisos, Atikki, Kritti, Ipeiros, Anatoliki 
Makedonia and Dityki Makedonia) and the Portuguese regions 
of Algarve or Alentejo. It should also be said that in regions 
that deteriorated over time, such as Alentejo, Ionia Nisia, 
Peloponnisos and Sterea Ellada, the relative degree of 
specialisation increased between 1985 and 1995. 
On the other hand, there was a notable positive correlation 
between the relative GDPpc in 1999 and R&D expenditure as 
a percentage of GDP, the degree of specialisation in medium 
and high tech industries (such as Chemical products, Transport 
equipment and, especially, in Metal machinery, equipment and 
electrical goods) and, in particular, the degree of specialisation 
in knowledge-intensive services such as Services of credit and 
insurance institutions. In addition, regions with higher wages 
per employee in 1990 presented high levels of GDPpc at the 
end of the period. A possible explanation would be that this 
variable may reflect the presence  of  a  better  qualified 
labour  force   in   the    richer regions. Finally, there seems to 
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 be a clear negative link between the relative level of GDPpc 
and the distance from the European Core throughout the 
period (despite the improvements in infrastructures, which 
reduced the importance of physical distance).  
As regards the link between the growth rate and regions’ 
characteristics, we should stress the negative relation between 
growth rates and the distance from the European Core, the 
level of specialisation at the beginning of the period and the 
relative level of specialisation in Agricultural products and in 
mature industries such as Textiles and clothing products and 
Paper and printing products. The reverse was found in the case 
of R&D expenditure in 1990 and also with the relative level of 
specialisation in all the services sectors (including non-market 
services). In addition, no relation was detected between 
growth rates and the peripheral index or wages per employee. 
It therefore seems that regions with a diversified sectoral 
structure, in which high tech industries and knowledge 
intensive services (especially credit and insurance services) 
played important roles, close to the European core, with 
substantial R&D expenditure and with relatively qualified 
labour force were able to benefit from the integration process 
and to improve their initial relative positions. Regions with a 
low degree of diversification in their sectoral structures (and 
thus a greater sensitivity to asymmetric shocks), relatively 
high levels of specialisation in the Agriculture sector and 
mature low tech industries (such as Textiles and Clothing, 
Paper and printing or Non-metallic minerals and mineral 
products) in the initial period, far from the European core, 
with low investment in R&D and with a preponderance of 
low-skilled labour showed the worst relative positions in term 
of GDPpc after 15 years of integration, being caught in a 
certain poverty trap. This was so despite changes in their 
sectorial structures (such as reducing the weight of the 
Agriculture sector in the GDP) and the existence of structural 
funds during this period. 
Empirical evidence for Candidate Regions 
GDP per capita growth for eastern countries reached an 
average figure of 7,49% over 1995-2001 (as against 6,14% in 
EU-15). Accession to the EU is expected to provide a solid 
basis for accelerated economic growth, with greater trade 
integration playing a leading role. This would enable these 
countries to bridge the considerable income gap with the 
European Union, as GDP per capita averages only 46% of the 
EU-15 level, with substantial disparities between Bulgaria 
(21,14%) and the Czech Republic (75,87%). Taking all these 
facts  into  account,   it is worth asking the question of what 
would   happen  at  regional  level  in candidate countries. 
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As regards the spatial distribution of GDP per capita, a 
heterogeneous regional pattern is detected. There are marked 
differences between two groups: one comprising Lithuania, 
Latvia, some regions of Bulgaria, Poland and Romania, and a 
second one made up by regions of the Czech Republic, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia and Cyprus. Comparison of GDP per 
capita distribution between 1995 and 1999 reveals an increase 
in inequality and polarisation at a regional level, even though 
the allocation of Funds to these candidate regions during these 
years increased over the period. As for concentration, analysis 
of the candidate regions for 1995 showed that Agricultural, 
fishing and forestry products and Fuel and power products 
were the most concentrated sectors, showing higher values 
than the EU-15 countries, while the reverse was the case for 
Manufactured products and Market services. As far as 
specialisation was concerned, Romanian regions (among the 
poorest regions of the Candidate countries), together with 
Prague and Ostravosko presented the highest levels; the least 
specialised were certain regions of Poland and Slovakia, and 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. 
To define the main characteristics of better (worse) positioned 
regions in terms of GDPpc, we studied the relation between 
relative GDPpc at the end of the period and certain structural 
variables such as a market potential index, degree of global 
specialisation, sectorial structure and distance from the 
European Core. This analysis suggests that the regions that are 
closer to the big European markets and the European Core 
(especially the border regions) and highly specialised in 
knowledge intensive services (in particular, Services of credit 
and insurance)  are clearly  better positioned than  the others in 
terms of GDPpc, and are more likely to benefit from 
integration. In contrast, candidate regions far from the 
European Core and highly specialised in Agricultural products 
show the lowest GDPpc levels in their group, and are 
potentially those with most to lose from integration (at least, in 
the first stages of the process). Finally, we should note that 
regions far from the EU core, with a low level of sectorial 
diversification and a high level of specialisation in 
Agricultural products, showed the lowest growth rates (1995-
1999).  
Policy guidelines and reflections before enlargement
The results presented here show that large regional disparities 
persist, especially between regions in countries that joined the 
EU during the eighties. In addition, the poorest regions are 
still highly specialised in sectors such as Agriculture which, 
far from generating rapid development, create poverty traps. 
Hence, the allocation of Structural funds does not seem to 
have provided a final solution to eliminate regional disparities 
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backward regions could have worsened their relative position 
without these Funds. For example, the fifth periodic report of 
the European Commission, 1994, on the situation and the 
socio- economic development of the European regions pointed 
out that the existence of the Structural Funds had increased a 
0.5% the GDP growth of the four Cohesion countries: Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
At the present time the EU is preparing for the entry of new 
candidate regions with large internal disparities which have 
actually increased in recent years in spite of cooperation 
programs. In this regard, enlargement conditions the future 
policy options open to the less developed regions in EU-15. 
Direct foreign investment in Central and Eastern regions 
(especially in the border regions), and the presence in these 
regions of lower wages in those sectors where the periphery of 
the EU-15 is more specialised may cause the current situation 
of the European periphery to deteriorate. In addition, many 
regions which at present benefit from Objective 1 funds will 
be excluded when candidate regions are admitted, not as a 
result of any real improvement in their situation but for solely 
statistical reasons.  
In the light of past experience, the maintenance of the current 
policy could mean that internal regional disparities in 
candidate countries will continue or even rise after 
enlargement. But the main worry is the persistence of 
polarisation. So a great deal of work remains to be done in 
order to create a new regional policy within an enlarged EU. 
However, prior to defining a structural framework for regional 
support, the EU would need to decide on its main social, 
political and economic goals. In this sense, a relevant question 
arises: should the prime objective of regional policy move 
toward economic efficiency and competitiveness or does a 
valid rationale also lie in providing support for regions which 
will always be disadvantaged by geography or economics? 
Then, regional policy faces a trade-off between equity and 
efficiency. 
Priority focused on achieving equity would imply policy 
measures addressed to backward regions. In this sense, results 
obtained from this analysis would suggest some possible
measures that could contribute to reduce the regional 
disparities: specific measures designed to speed up the 
adjustment of industrial structures and to encourage the 
development of new undertakings; promoting product 
differentiation      and    competitiveness    in  such sectors    as 
Agricultural and traditional areas (Textiles, Food, Paper 
among others) and thus combat their lower value added; 
increasing investment in inter-regional infrastructures in order 
to improve the accessibility of the poorest regions; increasing 
R&D  spending in  order to  promote the innovation  and  its 
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diffusion; and implementing effective human capital policies 
in backward regions. Additionally, in line with Guersent 
(2001), measures addressed to these less developed regions 
could also benefit to the most prosperous regions (for instance, 
in the form of imports). On the contrary, if efficiency would 
be the main goal, promoting growth at the most prosperous 
regions would be the key point. In this case, there could be 
spillover effects on less favoured regions, favouring equity in 
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In 2000 Europe 
was thought to 
be largely 
immune to a US 
downturn… 
The object of this section is to explore the changing 
transmission of shocks between one economy and another with 
specific reference to the transmission of the last US downturn to 
Europe.  The “state of the art” at the end of 2000 suggested that 
the impact of a US downturn on Europe could be quite limited: 
the Euro area, after all, approximates a closed economy and 
sophisticated multi-country econometric models (the IMF’s 
Multimod was then a leading example), which take full account 
of the trade linkages between economies, indicated that the 
spillover from the US to Europe would be relatively small.  In 
the event, the US downturn in 2001 seems to have heralded a 
relatively severe drop in output growth in Europe, too. 
Forecasts compiled in the Autumn of 2000 for output growth in 
the Euro area for the following year gave an impression of 
continued buoyancy which was to be rudely betrayed by reality. 
The European Commission’s November 2000 forecast for 
growth in the Euro area in the calendar year 2001, at 3.2%, was 
quite representative of general opinion.  The latest data put the 
2001 Euro area growth rate at only 1.4%.  The period of 
relatively asynchronous business cycle experience in the 80s and 
90s seems to have given way to a highly synchronous downturn 
at the beginning of the new decade. A careful discussion of this 
turn of events, and the puzzles it raises, can be found in the issue 
of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook  for October 2001.   
For Euro area policy-makers this is a significant problem: if 
spillovers from the US economy are highly significant for the 
Euro area, policy will need to track and anticipate the US 
economy and policy measures can be brought forward promptly 
on this basis.  If, on the other hand, the spillovers are small then 
the Euro area policy makers can treat the Euro area as a closed 
economy and US developments can be given lesser weight. 
We evaluate, using econometric techniques, whether the Euro 
area slowdown is due to there being a greater element of 
“common shock” in the European and American economies than 
had been supposed, or the spillovers from the US to Europe are 
larger and transmitted more quickly than the knowledge 
embodied so far in multi-country models allows for.  The two 
possibilities are not wholly mutually exclusive, of course.  
 
Chapter 5 
Shock Transmission in a Changing World 
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We jointly model the output growth rates of the US, Germany 
and, by turn, one of the other large European economies (i.e. 
one of France, Italy, UK and Spain). The US and Germany 
represent the two economies which are likely to offer a “pole 
of attraction” for the other European economies and are the 
economies with whose business cycles they might form an 
“affiliation”. 
We consider three types of shock: a common shock (denoted 
COS), a purely idiosyncratic shock (PIS) and an idiosyncratic 
shock with contemporaneous spillover (SIS). The distinction 
between the three is that a common shock is conceived of as 
one which is shared, contemporaneously, by all the economies 
under consideration; a purely idiosyncratic shock is one that 
originates in one of the two anchor economies, but is not 
shared by others (though other economies will of course 
eventually import some effects), whilst an idiosyncratic shock 
with contemporaneous spillover is one in which the main 
shock is located in one of the anchor economies but has some 
immediate spillover to other economies. We then evaluate the 
dynamic response of the European countries to these shocks. 
The next stage introduces the notion of “transition variables”: 
these are variables which condition the response of an 
economy to a shock.  They influence the propagation or 
transmission mechanism which translates the shock into a 
persistent process for output dynamics.  An example would be 
the structure of trade; a shock in an external economy (say, the 
US) could be expected to have different effects on other 
economies depending, inter alia, on their relative involvement 
in trade with the US.  Another transition variable is the 
structure of the labour market, where relative labour market 
rigidity is commonly perceived as leading to more persistent 
effects on unemployment and output in the face of a shock.  A 
further example is provided by financial variables, such as 
exchange rates, interest rates, stock market indices and the 
like, the level of which could be expected to influence the size 
of  the pass-through from the shock to the real economy. 
We identify threshold values such that the response of output 
to a shock can be different in the two regimes corresponding 
to “above” and “below” threshold values of the transition 
variable. We evaluate information from a large “bank” of 
transition variables and find that the financial variables are the 
most important, partly because they display greater variability 
through time than the structural variables. Over the past 20 
years, changes in the values of financial variables may have 
altered the transmission mechanism in such a way that a US 
shock (PIS or SIS) has come to have a greater effect on the 
…and allow 
their effects to 
depend on the 
















 The slowdown in 
Europe originates 
mainly from to the 








We then evaluate in more detail the 2001 slowdown. In 
particular, using our models with the financial threshold 
variables we compute the effects of a 3% cut in the US growth 
rate on the major European economies. The resulting values 
are then compared with the actual figures. 
We find that the effects on Europe depend on the chosen 
transition variable, but on average they are about 50% of the 
size of the US shock. Thus, the growth slowdown in Spain and 
Italy can be fully explained by the US shock, while national 
reasons are also important in the case of France and Germany. 
In summary, the transmission of the US shock to Europe can 
in the main be explained as the result of a fast and powerful 
transmission of a shock arising in that country. Whereas 
traditional multi-country models base their transmission 
channels solely on trade factors and produce evidence of a 
small spillover, it seems that a number of other channels must 
be active since our findings embody fast and sizable 
transmission. It must be significant that financial integration in 
the world economy has increased and that a large proportion 
of production comes from firms which are multinational in 
character.  The increasingly high correlation of  stock market 
indices round the world  suggests that one channel of 
transmission of a shock mainly affecting the US is through 
this route;  at the same time, monetary policy in other 
countries has to take the setting of US monetary policy into 
account.  The behavior of the foreign exchanges, another 
relevant transition variable from our analysis, may capture the 
markets’ assessments of individual country exposure.                 
 
